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An insured who fails to make full
taking of statements. 15 2
disclosure to his insurer runs the risk of forfeiting coverage by
Therefore, the
a breach of the policy's cooperation clause. 1'
insured should be encouraged to make a full and complete
statement to his insurer. 5 4
Yet if the position of the court in the principal case is
adopted, i.e., affording no immunity to a statement made by an
insured to his insurer, an insured in an automobile accident
would have reason to withhold data from his insurer. It would
seem, therefore, that some protection from inspection by a
plaintiff should be accorded to a statement made by an insured
to his insurer. That is not an extreme proposition and appears
to be justified.
As to whether such a statement should be treated as a
privileged communication under section 3101 (b): such treatment
would not appear to be warranted because a privileged communication (except for such as waiver and the like) enjoys an absolute
immunity; injured victims may therefore not avail themselves of
the contents of such statements, even if they show that hardship would result. The best approach would seem to be to
consider such statements as material prepared for litigation
undei section 3101(d) (2). This would encourage an insured
to make full disclosure to his insurer knowing that his statement is conditionally protected. This approach also takes into
account the interests of an injured victim because he would be
able to inspect the statement if he could show that undue hardship
would result if the statement were withheld.
In Durdovic v. Wisoff, 15 3 the plaintiff moved to examine
certain insurance company employees with respect to conversations
of a physician with plaintiff's intestate prior to their respective
deaths. The plaintiff relied on Babcock v. Jackson as the
authority for his motion. The court distinguished Babcock on
the ground that in Babcock the plaintiff knew the statement was
in existence when the motion for disclosure was made. In
Durdovic the court found that there wa io evidence that there
were any notes in existence or that the physician, before he died,
signed a statement for the insurer.
Party Obtaining a Copy of His Own Statement
In Briggs v. Spencerport Road Plaza, Inc., 6 plaintiffs' attorney obtained a statement from an employee of defendant
152 Cataldo v. County of Monroe, sup-a note 151, at 771, 238 N.Y.S.2d at
858.
153 Schulgasser v. Young, supra note 151, at 792, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
154 Hollien v. Kaye, supra note 150, at 825, 87 N.Y.S.2d Pt 786.
15541 Misc. 2d 639, 246 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1964).

156 19 App. Div. 2d 943, 244 N.Y.S.2d 17 (4th Dep't 1963).
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corporation who witnessed the accident. The court granted the
defendant's motion for discovery and inspection of the statement
on the ground that since a party may obtain a copy of his own
statement, 157 the corporation is entitled to receive the statement
made by its employee.
Section 3101(e) of the CPLR provides that "a party may
While this subdivision
obtain a copy of his own statement."
had no counterpart in either the CPA or the RCP it was supported by case law. 158 It was the intent of the Revisers that
a party be able to obtain a copy of his own statement upon
request, 159 without the burden of proving special circumstances
such as fraud or overreaching.' 60 In Sack v. All States Holding
Corp.,"" a second department decision under the CPA, the court
held that a party could not obtain a copy of his own statement
unless special circumstances were shown.' 62 The court in Schuner
v. Pearlnan,163 a lower court case in the second department,
indicated that the "special circumstance" test established in Sack
would (even under the CPA) no longer be applied. In addition, neither the first nor the third departments required a
showing of special circumstances. 64 At the time of the enactment
of the CPLR, it appeared doubtful that a party was required
to establish special circumstances to obtain a copy of his own
statement.
Under section 3101(e) a party may by mere request obtain
a copy of his own statement. In the present case, however,
it was not a statement of a party that was involved but a
statement of its employee. In permitting the corporation to
obtain a copy of its employee's statement the court was obviously
noting that when a corporation makes a statement it can do
so only through one of its employees. Hence, when a corporation
obtains a copy of one of its employee's statements it is, in effect,
obtaining its own statement. 65
157 CPLR § 3101(e).

158E.g., Sacks v. Greyhound Corp., 18 App. Div. 2d 747,
669 (3d Dep't 1962); Totoritus v. Stefan, 6 App. Div. 2d 123,
802 (1st Dep't), rearguinent and appeal denied, 6 App. Div.
N.Y.S.2d 213 (1958); Levey v. Heemme, 7 App. Div. 2d 646,
228 (2d Dep't 1958); Bassney v. Erie R.R., 24 Misc. 2d 350,
838 (Sup. Ct 1960).
159 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR § 3101, commentary 7.
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160 FMsT REP. 121, 475.

161 268 App. Div. 793, 49 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1944).
162 This rule was followed in Hollieh v. Kaye, supra note 150.
163 208 N.Y.S.2d 753 (N.Y. City Ct. 1960), citing Levey v. Hernme, supra
note 158.
164E.g., Tortoritus v. Stefan. supra note 158; Holleran v. Kenna, 6 App.

Div. 2d 740, 174 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d Dep't 1958); Wilhelm v. Abel, 1 App. Div.
2d 55, 147 N.Y.S.2d 475 (3d Dep't 1955).
165 Compare CPLR § 3101(a) (1).
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In Beyer v. Keller,166 discovery and inspection of a statement
made by the mother of an infant plaintiff was permitted. The
basis of this decision was that "where there is a disability on the
part of the injured person to testify and where there is such
a close relationship between the witness whose statement was
taken and the person injured" 167 such statement may be obtained.
In the Briggs case, the court did not consider that "close
relationship" should be restricted to blood relationships alone.
It has been suggested that "may obtain a copy of his own
statement" may be susceptible of either of two constructions. 6 8
It could be construed to mean either that a party may do so
by mere notice, or must first get a court order. If an order
be deemed necessary, the scope of discovery and inspection would
be more restrictive than it was under the CPA or RCP. As has
been indicated previously, in the first and third departments it
was unnecessary to show special circumstances and the second
department, too, seemed to have abandoned the "special circumstance" test. Therefore, the law as it existed just prior to the
enactment of the CPLR seemed to allow a party to obtain a
copy of his own statement by mere notice. "[MJ ay obtain a
copy of his own statement" should be construed to permit a
party to use the notice procedure under the CPLR as well.
Priority of Depositions
Rule 3106 of the CPLR deals with the priority of depositions.
It in effect provides that a defendant shall have the initial
opportunity to take testimony by deposition. This results because
a defendant need only serve notice whereas a plaintiff must obtain
leave of court in order to take testimony within twenty days
after the service of the complaint. This advantage of the defendant
is based on the theory that since he is blameless until proved
liable he should, in the absence of special circumstances, be given
priority in obtaining the first examination. 69 This provision
appears to be an adoption of prior second department practice
which permitted the17 0party who first served notice to conduct
the first examination.
166 11 App. Div. 2d 426, 207 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1st Dep't 1960), reargumnent
denied
and appeal granted, 12 App. Div. 2d 740, 210 N.Y.S2d 965 (1961).:
16 7 Id. at 428, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
168 CA moDY-FORKOScH, NEW YoRx PRAcTicE § 621, at 558 n.9 (8th ed.
1963).
1693 WEINsTmN, KoRN & Mtium.,
Nmw YoRK Civrm PRAcricE 13106.02
(1963).
170 E.g., Samnuels v. Hirsch, 12 App. Div. 2d 823, 207 N.Y.S.2d 960 (2d
Dep't 1961); Desiderio v. Gabrielli, 284 App. Div. 976, 135 N.Y.S2d 1
(2d Dep't 1954).

